Hey folks,
Been diving into some thoughts lately. If someone’s looking to store Bitcoin long-term, like 10 or 20 years, how can they ensure they or a trusted person can still access it? Most just go with a seed phrase or multisig, but honestly, I’m not fully convinced those methods will hold up.
Long-Term Bitcoin Storage Strategies: Exploring Taproot and Beyond
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I mentioned something similar a few days ago. It’s a simpler idea, really. A cold wallet setup that you could forget about, even with quantum computing looming. The idea is to use a hashlock, so you’d need both a private key and a secret to access the coins.
But there’s a catch here. No OPCODES to verify signatures from different cryptographic systems. So, the second and third options feel pretty similar, right? It’s just about providing data rather than a signed signature, which opens up risks, especially if someone tries to double spend.
Every TapScript output runs on SHA-256, so if you stick with that, you should be okay. But if SHA-256 gets cracked, we’re in trouble. It could compromise everything from Proof of Work to ECDSA signatures and more. If an attacker can mess with Proof of Work, your coins are toast.
I see your point. I didn’t fully consider that. The backup with the paper and hash was more of a last resort if everything else fails. But you’re right, using it when quantum stuff is real could backfire.
I think you picked a bad example. The guy didn’t lose his keys due to tech issues; he just didn’t care about that BTC when he tossed the HDD. New techniques can help, but complex setups might scare off users and even experienced folks might forget how to retrieve their hidden stash.
I get what you mean. Since Bitcoin can’t verify post-quantum signatures yet, both the second and third options are in the same boat. It’s just about revealing some preimage. The PQ public key feels like a tech backup, while the entropy one seems more human-focused. But yeah, revealing the preimage first is a risk.
The attacker’s not picky about whether it’s random data or a PQ public key. Same weakness applies. There was a discussion about spending rewards for hash collision challenges too.
You could find a trusted mining pool to include your TX without broadcasting it. But honestly, I wouldn’t bother with non-standard ways to spend Bitcoin. Too risky if you forget how to access it.
Totally agree, the attacker doesn’t care where the data comes from. Once it’s out there, it’s game over. I’ll check that hash collision bounty thread too.
The mining pool trick is cool, I’ve seen it used for privacy, but I never thought of it to avoid front running. It’s tricky though, trusting the pool is key. Do you think adaptor signatures or clever Taproot setups could help? Or is the reveal-before-spend issue still a problem?
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