Been looking into Shor's Algorithm, and honestly, it's still a huge theoretical threat. It can solve the discrete logarithm problem, which means it can potentially derive private keys from public keys on vulnerable addresses like older P2PKH or reused P2PK. We're talking about millions of BTC at risk here, like over 6 million, that could be harvested now and decrypted later. That's a massive amount, especially if you convert it to dollars. So yeah, Shor's algorithm is definitely a concern.
What you're saying is pretty well-known at this point. Just a reminder though, Bitcoin isn't using encryption in the traditional sense. You'd really need a quantum computer with enough qubits and minimal error rates to extract private keys from public ones.
Exactly, Bitcoin doesn’t really encrypt data but does expose public keys when UTXOs are spent. So if attackers grab those public keys now, they might try to figure out the private keys later. They’re banking on future quantum computers running Shor's algorithm to pull it off.
You mixed up the script types there. It should be 'older P2PK' for unspent transaction outputs, which aren't technically addresses, and 'reused P2PKH' for addresses. Also, could you share some specifics like references or technical details? Otherwise, this feels more like a general Bitcoin topic than a deep dive.
Hey, I’m actually working on this and we’re digging into Shor for Bitcoin vulnerabilities. Sure, Shor sounds amazing, but the quantum computers we have now barely reach tens of qubits and are super error-prone. We tried some tests on Azure Quantum, but couldn’t even run certain algorithms because SECPK256 and PBKDF need millions of qubits for the entanglements. The bigger risk for Bitcoin in the next decade is still Pollard Rho on known public keys and the leakage of a significant portion of its seed, which could open up brute-force attacks.
Really? Most Bitcoin isn’t stored on weakly generated addresses or public keys. The Bitcoin that gets unlocked like that usually comes from wallets with poor security on seed or private key generation. Most reputable wallets are secure now. Or they’re made with lower bits for testing, but yeah, the quantum threat is still real.
Individual attackers won’t have the resources to assemble the qubits needed for cracking an elliptic curve. But it’s an anticipated threat, not an immediate one. Nobody really knows when the qubits will be ready. Remember, just a few years ago, quantum computing was thought to be impossible, and now we have this panic.