Reusing Nonce in P2PKH Addresses: Security Risks

Hey everyone, I stumbled upon some P2PKH address pairs that were created in a messed-up virtual environment. Turns out the same nonce r was reused between them. Here’s what I noticed: 1. TX 1 r = 5c16a3fbafc1ef0 Public Key = 956fb654bcb2e061 2. TX 2 (just 3 days later) r = 5c16a3fbafc1ef0 Public Key = 4b20eabe93918281 Both transactions sent money to the same address, which reused the nonce k with the same private key. Crazy, right?

Not sure what your endgame is, but using RFC 6979 would totally avoid this. Different keys with the same message hash will always result in different k values.

Just because you have two signatures for different private keys using the same nonce, doesn’t mean you can figure out the private keys. Even if they used the same nonce. But if you get two signatures with the same nonce for the same private key, that's a whole different story.

A little more context: Example addresses: 1AxP2pkhFakeAddressExample1111 1A1P2pkhFakeAddressExample2222 1A2P2pkhFakeAddressExample3333... So, multiple addresses sent funds to 1Ax while Ax reused the same nonce k, making Ax compromised. Also, it shared k with others, putting them at risk too.

What’s your transaction setup? Reusing nonces like this is super risky. If Ax signed twice with the same nonce, the private key’s exposed. You can figure out the nonce and then get all private keys linked to it. Move your funds to a secure place ASAP.

Sometimes, these issues show up in the same transaction. Look at these: Trx 1: Ax > A1 > A2 > Ax > A3 > A4 And so on. I’m digging into cases where nonces were reused across addresses in later transactions.

If you have the private key for Ax, then you can get the private keys for any other address that shared its nonce. Idea is to move the funds to a safe wallet before anything happens.

I only have Ax’s private key. The other ones that shared the nonce are empty. But A4 and A5 interest me since their transactions were just three days apart. It’s like we have a system with more variables than equations.

The nonce used by those two signatures doesn’t link back to Ax, though. Are you considering A4 and A5 as derivatives of Ax? Focus on deriving from Ax instead of those two.

I think A1 through A8 are children of Ax. They all sent to Ax on the same day and sometimes in the same transaction. Just a reminder, these addresses are quite old, created around 2015.

Let’s look back at an earlier example. Someone compiled a list of the most reused r values ever. Top ranked used thousands of times. We could analyze those.

Been there, done that. I used some method to consolidate tiny outputs in the past. My transactions were small and got included quickly beat the bots. So, about that transaction you mentioned, thoughts?

Yeah, totally different format, but you noticed the R and S values, right?

Going back to that nonce reuse situation, have you seen cases where two keys reused the same nonce multiple times? Wondering if there's a way to recover private keys from this or any other method.

Even with R, S, Z, P, you can create a lot of valid outputs, but without knowing how K was picked, it’s just math without substance.

Those P2PKH addresses are compromised for sure. With around 4 BTC at stake, it’s a problem. I want to brute-force the nonce or come up with any clever way to recover it.

Do you catch my drift? I can provide valid R, S, Zn, Pn sets for any R, S, but without knowing how 'K' was generated, it’s kinda useless.

Have you seen any similar issues like this? Any efficient brute-force methods for situations like this?

Sure, just message me. I got some insights.

So, looking back, one of the addresses has a bit over 2 BTC and there’s a pattern across 6 RSZ signatures. The second signature shares an r value with some empty addresses.